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ture is susceptible to random failures (fragility) and targeted attacks
(vulnerability). More importantly, the desire is to know the kinds of
policies that tend to create a network form that is neither fragile nor
vulnerable. These research objectives distinguish this research from
previous studies that have focused on the measurement of network
reliability (1–5) and the identification of weak spots in existing
networks (6). Compared with the attempts that have been made to
include reliability measures in the network design problem (7),
the models presented below simulate the long-term impacts of the
repetitive execution of an investment policy over a period of time.
This paper develops a model of transportation network growth
under alternative policies at the link (microscopic) level. Two road
investment rules, beneﬁt–cost analysis and bottleneck removal, are
modeled, and the performance of the resulting road networks at
equilibrium is compared. The robustness and reliability of the
equilibrium networks are evaluated under several network degrada-
tion scenarios, including random link failures and targeted attacks,
followed by conclusions and suggestions for future research.
MODEL OF TRANSPORTATION 
NETWORK GROWTH
The network dynamics model speciﬁed in this section brings together
all relevant agents and their interactions to simulate road expansion
and contraction. The complexity of the whole transportation system
in a region cannot be described fully by the proposed transportation
network growth model, and therefore, it has certain limitations. Eco-
nomic growth must be taken as an exogenous variable, because the
transportation infrastructure is not the only factor that drives eco-
nomic growth. Land use dynamics and population changes are also
treated as exogenous variables in the network analysis. These lim-
itations can be removed in future research. Attention is focused
on road network growth, a process with enough complicated and
unknown dynamics for one to start with. The endogenous variables
considered in the model are travel behavior and demand, road main-
tenance and expansion costs, pricing rules and revenue, investment
policy, and road expansion and degeneration.
An overview of the model components and their interconnectivity
is shown in Figure 1. A travel demand model predicts link-level ﬂows
on the basis of the road network, land use patterns, and socioeconomic
and demographic information. On the basis of the demand forecast-
ing results, links are used to calculate revenues and costs. An invest-
ment module then operates and causes annual supply changes,
producing an updated network. The modeling process does not have
to iterate annually. Other updating intervals can also be used. Yearly
supply changes, however, correspond to budgets that are typically
decided each ﬁscal year. The road network is represented by a directed
graph that connects nodes with directional arcs (links). The standard
notation convention for directed graphs is adopted for the following
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Alternative transportation investment policies can lead to very different
network forms in the future. The desirability of a transportation net-
work should be assessed not only by its economic efficiency but also by
its reliability and security, because the cost of an incidental capacity loss
in a road network can be massive. This research concerns how invest-
ment rules shape the hierarchical structure of roads and affect network
fragility to natural disasters, congestion, and accidents and vulnerabil-
ity to targeted attacks. A microscopic network growth model predicts
the equilibrium road networks under two alternative policy scenarios:
investment based on beneﬁt–cost analysis and investment based on bottle-
neck removal. A set of Monte Carlo simulation runs, in which a certain
percentage of links was removed according to the type of network
degradation analyzed, was carried out to evaluate the equilibrium road
networks. It was found that a hierarchy existed in road networks for
reasons such as economic efficiency but that an overly hierarchical
structure had serious reliability problems. Throughout the equilibrating
or evolution process, the grid network studied under beneﬁt–cost analysis
had better efficiency performance, as well as error and attack tolerance.
The paper demonstrates that reliability and security considerations can
be integrated into the planning of transportation systems.
Transportation networks support various vital human activities, and
their performance affects the efficiency of virtually all economic trans-
actions. The design of an effective transportation network has thus
become an important task for planners. Traditionally, the desirability
of a transportation network is assessed by its efficiency under prevail-
ing conditions, for example, the total travel cost of moving a subject
from an origin to a destination. More recently, several measures of
transportation network reliability have explicitly considered the prob-
abilistic nature of network performance. The uncertainty may be cre-
ated by one or more of the following sources: demand ﬂuctuation,
random link failures because of congestion or accidents, natural disas-
ters, or targeted attacks. Decision makers need to consider the poten-
tial trade-off between network efficiency and reliability when they
forge policies that could shape future transportation networks.
For several economic and geographical reasons, transportation net-
works typically evolve into hierarchical structures in which few links
carry the bulk of traffic and a large number of smaller links have very
low ﬂows. A subsequent question is whether such a hierarchical struc-
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submodels.
Travel Demand
A traditional four-step forecasting model is used to predict travel
demand at the link level by taking land use, socioeconomics, and the
existing network as exogenous variables. A zone-based regression
structure is used for trip generation. The origin–destination (O-D)
cost table obtained from the traffic assignment for the previous year
is used for trip distribution in the current year, based on a doubly




rs = demand from origin zone r to destination zone s in 
year i,
Or = number of trips produced from zone r,
Ds = number of trips destined for zone s,
mr, ns = coefficients in the gravity model,
t
i
rs = generalized travel cost of traveling from zone r to s, and





rsand γis the coefficient in the impedance
function.
The resulting O-D table is loaded onto the transportation network
for the current year through the origin-based user equilibrium traffic
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assignment algorithm developed by Bar-Gera and Boyce (9). The
generalized link cost function comprises two parts, a travel time com-
ponent and a vehicle toll. The travel time component uses the Bureau




a = generalized travel cost on link a in year i,
λ=value of travel time constant (dollars per hour),
v
i
a = free-ﬂow speed of link a (km/h) in year i,
F
i
a = capacity of link ain year i(number of vehicles per hour),
la = length of link a (constant) (km),
f
i
a = average hourly ﬂow on link ain year i(number of vehicles
per hour),
θ1, θ2 = coefficients of the BPR travel time function, and
τ
i
a = link toll per vehicle (dollars; see Equations 3 and 4 for
details).
In the traffic assignment step, if the relative excess travel cost is
less than 0.001, the Wardrop user equilibrium is considered to be
satisﬁed.
Price and Revenue
Revenue is collected at the link level by means of a toll on vehicles.
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FIGURE 1 Flowchart of the network growth model (UE = user equilibrium).ﬂow. The amount of the toll depends on the pricing policy speciﬁed.
Fuel taxes in the United States are modeled in Equation 4. Fuel taxes
are essentially a distance-based toll if the variation in automobile
fuel efficiency is ignored. The revenue collected from fuel taxes is





a = revenue (earnings) of link a in year i (dollars),
ψ=coefficient used to scale the average hourly ﬂow to the
annual ﬂow, and
ρ1 = scale coefficient related to the toll level (dollars  h
ρ3/km
ρ2+ρ3),
where ρ2 and ρ3 are coefficients indicating economies or
diseconomies of scale.
Maintenance Cost
Empirical evidence shows that the costs of maintaining and oper-
ating roads are only partially (30% and 46%, respectively) related
to the traffic volume on the road (11; W. D. O. Paterson and R.
Archondo-Callao, Estimating Road Use Cost, unpublished docu-
ment, World Bank, Washington, D.C., Sept. 1991). Some mainte-
nance expenditures are ﬁxed and irrespective of traffic. Nonlinear
increases in maintenance costs with respect to traffic volume have
also been observed. Traffic loading characteristics also affect costs
for pavement resurfacing. A simpliﬁed link maintenance cost func-
tion is speciﬁed with three determining factors: link length, capacity,
and volume. Therefore, all maintenance costs unrelated to traffic are




a = cost of maintaining link a at its present condition in
year i (dollars),
µ = scale parameter (dollar   h
α2 +α 3/km
α1), and
α1 to α3 = coefficients indicating economies or diseconomies of
scale.
Construction Cost
The cost of road construction depends on many factors: the lane miles
of construction, road hierarchy (road types, e.g., Interstate highway
or state highway), land acquisition cost, degree of urbanization, ter-
rain, and elevated sections (e.g., interchanges and bridges). Keeler
and Small developed a construction cost model with only two vari-
ables, lane miles of construction and degree of urbanization (12).
Their model explains about 52% of the total cost variation. A regres-
sion model developed for construction projects in the Twin Cities in
Minnesota is able to explain 77% of the cost variation with two addi-
tional variables: road hierarchy and the duration of construction (13).
A three-variable function is speciﬁed for road construction cost. The
product of the ﬁrst and third terms in this cost function is similar to
the lane mile variable in previous studies. The second term implies
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road hierarchy. According to this cost function, it is more expensive
to construct a road that is longer, has a high existing capacity (is




a = cost of expanding link a in year i (dollars),
φ=scale parameter, and
σ1 to σ3 = coefficients indicating economies or diseconomies of
scale.
Some consider investments in road construction to be discrete,
highly indivisible, and lumpy, whereas others argue that investments
in capacity improvements are usually less lumpy than they seem (14).
Existing evidence supports both arguments. A road can be built with
only a discrete number of lanes or can be expanded only by the addi-
tion of a discrete number of lanes. However, incremental capacity
improvements can also be achieved by enhancing management effi-
ciencies, widening shoulders, and resurfacing pavement. Equation 6
is a continuous function. However, it can also describe the costs of
discrete road expansions with an additional constraint. That can be
done by keeping track of the existing number of lanes for each road
in the network and estimating a capacity–number-of-lane function.
The capacity–number-of-lane function determines the capacity of a
road section according to the number of lanes (L):
where L
i
a is the number of lanes in link a in year i and η0 to η2 are
empirically derived coefficients. The second-order term is included
to capture the possible nonlinearity of capacity increases. This func-
tion can estimate the construction cost required to add one or two
more lanes to an existing road. It should be noted that for simplicity
the level of urbanization (indicated by residential density or the dis-
tance from the nearest downtown) is not included in the expansion
cost model.
Investment Rule
The investment model takes the revenues and costs on all links as
inputs and determines how revenues are distributed to maintain and
expand the network. If the amount of revenue distributed to a link is
not sufficient to defray its maintenance cost, the capacity of the link
will decrease in the next iteration. Revenues may also be used to
expand some links in the network, depending on the speciﬁc invest-
ment policy and organizational structure. The next section describes
two common investment policies in detail. The amount of capac-
ity change can be determined by the construction cost function in
a discrete or continuous manner. A capacity change on a link is
sometimes associated with a concurrent change in free-ﬂow speed.
Vehicles are, in general, able to travel faster on wider roads. A log-
linear function is speciﬁed to capture the coevolution of capacity
and free-ﬂow speed:
where ω1 and ω2 are empirically derived coefficients.
With an updated link capacity and free-ﬂow speed, some factors
inﬂuencing travel behavior, such as link travel time and toll level, will
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1 23 1 6 ()growth, and demographic changes, give rise to the emergence of a
new demand pattern in the next iteration.
Estimation of Model Parameters
The exact values of the parameters in the network dynamics model
depend on the road network in question. This section discusses in
general the empirical data required for model estimation and their
likely sources and, in particular, discusses the derivation of a com-
plete set of parameter estimates for the road network in the Twin
Cities metropolitan area. An earlier version of the network dynam-
ics model was previously applied to the Twin Cities road network
(L. Zhang and D. Levinson, A model of the rise and fall of roads,
unpublished paper, 2008).
The ﬁrst set of data required for the execution of the network
dynamics model is the initial network status, including the capacity,
length, free-ﬂow speed, and tolls (if any) for all links and their con-
nectivity. Changes in land use, demographics, and regional economy
are assumed to be exogenous and, therefore, should be obtained from
corresponding forecasting models.
Travel demand forecasting has become a fairly standard plan-
ning exercise over the years. Most metropolitan areas update their
travel demand models, mostly four-step models, every 5 or 10 years.
The parameters related to travel demand, such as γ in the gravity
model, should be available from metropolitan planning organizations
(Equation 1). In the Twin Cities, the value of γ is about 0.1.
As mentioned earlier, the equation determining the amount of toll
on a road should be derived from the speciﬁc pricing policy. In the
Twin Cities, as well as other cities in the United States, fuel tax rev-
enues have been the major sources of road funds. If the variation in gas
mileage among vehicles is ignored, fuel tax is essentially a distance-
based user fee (ρ2 = 1 and ρ3 = 0; see Equation 4). The constant term
is determined from the amount of surcharge per gallon and is then
normalized to unity by constant terms in the cost functions.
Keeler and Small estimated a simple linear model of road mainte-
nance costs using project-level data (12). In their speciﬁcation, main-
tenance cost is a function of vehicle miles of travel. Heggie calculated
maintenance costs on the basis of both vehicle kilometers of travel
and road hierarchy (15). Paterson and Archondo-Callao show that
only about 46% of total maintenance costs are traffic related, whereas
the remaining 54% of costs are ﬁxed costs (11). Road-speciﬁc data
would enable the most accurate estimation of maintenance cost.
There is evidence of substantial economies of scale in maintenance
cost as the traffic volume increases. The maintenance cost per vehi-
cle kilometer of travel is much lower on a high-volume road. This
suggests that α3 is between 0 and 1 (Equation 5). Although it is con-
ceivable that higher-level roads, such as an Interstate highway, are
more expensive to maintain than lower-level roads, such as an arte-
rial street, even if they carry the same amount of traffic (α2 > 0), no
previous study has exactly estimated α2. It is assumed that there are
diseconomies of scale in road maintenance as the capacity of the
road increases (α2 > 1).
For the estimation of the road expansion cost function (Equa-
tion 6), data at the project level are again the most desirable. Several
previous studies on economies of scale in road construction use lane
miles of expansion as a predictor, effectively assuming that σ1 is
equal to σ3 (12, 16, 17). Construction projects of all sizes are com-
bined, and therefore, it is not surprising most of them ﬁnd nearly
constant returns to scale (σ1=σ 3=1). A recent study with data from
110 projects in the Twin Cities showed signiﬁcant increasing returns
to scale (σ1 =σ 3 = 0.5) after controlling for road hierarchy (13).
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Using the same data set, the authors found constant returns to scale
without controlling for road hierarchy. It should be more expensive
to expand a road that already has a high capacity because of increas-
ing land acquisition costs (13). Therefore, a σ2 value >1 is a plausi-
ble assumption with the absence of any deﬁnitive knowledge. These
observations suggest that σ1is equal to σ3, which is equal to 1, and so
far seem to be the most reliable estimates for the road expansion cost
function and that there is a need for further studies on cost functions
(e.g., a function that considers second-order effects, factor prices, and
land acquisition costs). The cost data for the Twin Cities were col-
lected from the Transportation Improvement Program managed by
the Metropolitan Council.
The database that the Metropolitan Council developed for the
regional transportation planning model also includes capacity,
free-flow speed, and the number of lanes for more than 10,000
road segments in the Twin Cities. These data are used to estimate the
capacity–number-of-lane function (Equation 7) and the capacity–
speed function (Equation 8). All coefficients are statistically signiﬁ-
cant at the .05 level (η1=341, η1=162, η2=273, ω1=−30.6, ω2=9.8).
The R
2 values of the two models are .6 and .7, respectively. The
predicted values of the dependent variables are plotted against the
observed data in Figure 2.
For normative applications (e.g., policy evaluation), the invest-
ment rule should be specified in accordance with the investment
policy being evaluated. In that case, no calibration or validation





FIGURE 2 Capacity–speed (vph  number of vehicles per hour)
and capacity–number-of-lane functions.parameters estimated or assumed for the Twin Cities (TC) road
network is summarized in Table 1.
INVESTMENT POLICIES
The capacity of a road is at the optimal level if the marginal beneﬁt
of building an additional unit of capacity just equals the total cost of
providing it. This optimality condition establishes a long-run invest-
ment goal but does not provide guidelines for long-term investment
decisions. Beneﬁt–cost analysis has become the basis for many
investment decisions. Some engineering procedures, such as bottle-
neck removal, have also been established to distribute road funds to
individual projects. These two investment rules are discussed and
modeled for general road networks in this section.
Bottleneck Removal
The bottleneck removal policy tends to favor expansion projects on
road sections with the most severe congestion problems. A mathe-
matical model is developed to describe this type of investment rule.
In this model, the total network revenue (ET) collected on all roads
is managed by a centralized agency, which is also responsible for its
distribution.
All roads must be maintained at their current level of service.
Total maintenance costs (MT) can be derived as follows:
A portion of the revenue is appropriated to defray maintenance
costs. The remaining disposable revenue (ED) is used to expand
capacity on the basis of the current level of congestion, as indicated
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by the volume-to-capacity ratio (S) on each road. Road a, which has
the highest value of S in the network, is expanded ﬁrst. The amount
of capacity improvement is determined by the desirable value of Sor
the target level of service, S*. The value of S* should depend on the
performance of the network as a whole. The average value of S for
all roads is used.
The required expansion cost and the remaining revenue after
expansion are as indicated in Equations 13 and 14, respectively:
The second most congested road is expanded next. The amounts of
the capacity improvements, expansion costs, and the remaining
revenue can be determined similarly. This process continues until
the revenue is exhausted.
One assumption in the procedure described above is the divis-
ibility of road investments. In Equation 11, Fa
i+1can take any pos-
itive value. A more realistic model would allow only discrete road
expansion. This assumption is relaxed by using Equation 7. In the
discrete case, the desirable new capacity is compared with the
actual capacity if one, two, or three lanes are added, which deter-
mines the number of lanes in the expansion and the resulting
expansion costs.
Beneﬁt–Cost Analysis
Different from bottleneck removal, beneﬁt–cost analysis considers
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TABLE 1 Coefficients in Network Growth Model

















NOTE: CRS are DRS constant and decreasing returns to scale.
Value of travel time constant ($/h)
Coefficients in the BPR function
Coefficient in the gravity model
Combined scale coefficient in revenue model (dollar   h
ρ3/km
ρ2+ρ3)
Power term of length in revenue model
Power term of speed in revenue model
Scale coefficient in cost model (dollar   h
α2/km
α1)
Power term of length in cost model
Power term of capacity in cost model
Power term of ﬂow in cost model
Coefficient in the speed–capacity log-linear regression model
Coefficient in the capacity–number-of-lane quadratic regression model
Scale coefficient in cost model
Power term of length in cost model
Power term of capacity in cost model

















Empirical estimate in TC
BPR recommended value
Empirical estimate in TC
Scale parameter
CRS of link length
Distance based only
Scale parameter
CRS of link length
DRS of capacity
Ignore variable cost
Empirical estimates based on Twin Cities data
Empirical estimates based on Twin Cities data
Scale parameter
CRS of link length
DRS of capacity
CRS in road constructionfor the discussion of beneﬁts and costs (18). The costs to society may
not be considered real costs to a company unless they are somehow
internalized. Again, a public agency is considered, and it is assumed
that its goal is to maximize social welfare.
The life-cycle cost (Ca) of a road expansion project can be esti-
mated by the construction and maintenance cost functions developed
as described above:
where
y = planning horizon or estimated life duration of the road;
R = interest rate;
F
0
a = existing capacity;
F
1
a = capacity after expansion; and
f
i
a = traffic volume in year y, where f
i






existing traffic volume, and x is the annual rate of traffic
growth.
The life-cycle beneﬁts of road expansion are usually manifold, and
some components are hard to quantify. Once a road is expanded, the
congestion level on the road being expanded will drop, at least in the
short run, resulting in less commute time, more reliable travel, fewer
accidents, and reduced air pollution and energy consumption. The
exact systemwide beneﬁts are less clear because the expansion of a
road tends to increase congestion on its complementary roads and
attracts traffic away from its competitors. For simplicity, a formula for
beneﬁt (Ba) estimation that considers only travel time savings on the
road being expanded is speciﬁed. All nonlocal beneﬁts, as well as
inﬂuences on accidents, pollution, and fuel consumption, are ignored.
Induced demand is also ignored.
The optimal amount of capacity expansion can be identiﬁed for each
road by maximizing the resulting beneﬁt–cost ratio. This is a non-
linear programming problem with a fairly complex objective function.
However, roads can be expanded by only a ﬁxed number of lanes,
which helps simplify the optimization problem. The beneﬁt–cost
ratios that correspond to the addition of one, two, or three lanes can
be evaluated quickly; and the maximum possible beneﬁt–cost ratio
(BC*), as well as the optimal number of lanes to be expanded (F*),
can be identiﬁed for each road. The available funds should always
be allocated to expand the road with the highest BC* by F* until
exhaustion of the funds.
EMERGENCE OF ROAD HIERARCHY
The network growth model can be applied to any realistic roadway
network, and the execution time is largely determined by the con-
vergence speed of the traffic assignment algorithm. A 10-by-10 grid
network (100 nodes and 360 links) is used in this section to evalu-
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reliability. The same initial condition is speciﬁed for both policy
scenarios. All links in the grid network are 4 km in length and have
an initial capacity of 735 vehicles per hour (this value corresponds
to a one-lane road, according to the regression analysis with the
capacity and number-of-lane data in the Twin Cities; see Equation 7).
The initial network is heavily congested, with an average S value
of 0.8 and an average speed of about 10 km/h. The initial land use
is uniform among all 100 network zones, with 10,000 trips origi-
nating from and destined for each zone. O-D demand is not fixed
over the years because of changes in link capacity and real travel
costs. The convergence of the simulation model can be measured
directly by the number of expansion activities in the network.
Under centralized control, the network achieves long-run supply–
demand equilibrium if the total revenue is just equal to the total
required maintenance cost (i.e., there are no more road expansions
or contractions).
Network investment based on benefit–cost analysis produces
a more efficient road network in the short run and the long run
(Figure 3). An interesting observation is that the total number of
vehicle hours of travel (VHT) in both scenarios seems to converge
over time. After the equilibrium is achieved, the difference in VHT
is less than 3% (beneﬁt–cost analysis = 0.31 million hours; bottle-
neck removal = 0.32 million hours), although the largest difference
over the 50-year period is 20%. The bottleneck removal policy
always expands the most congested roads ﬁrst, without a full assess-
ment of beneﬁts and costs. However, the mechanism of induced
demand, sometimes depicted as the “iron law of traffic congestion”
(20), starts taking effect and the expanded capacity is quickly ﬁlled
by new traffic. This phenomenon has also been repeatedly observed
in reality. The level of congestion on a newly expanded road can
return to its original level within a short period of time (20, 21). As
such, the roads expanded in a previous year are actually more likely
to be expanded again under the bottleneck removal policy. Over time,
this the-rich-get-richer cycle creates highly hierarchical road pat-
terns (Figure 4). The distribution of road capacity seems to follow a
power law (22). Similar patterns are not observed when investment
decisions are guided by beneﬁt–cost analysis. The capacity distri-
bution may be approximated well by a normal distribution (or a Pois-
son distribution, because of nonnegativity), although there are not
enough data points to verify this hypothesis. The real capacity distri-
bution of all roads in the Twin Cities network in 1998 suggests that it










FIGURE 3 Network efficiency under alternative investment
policies.has historically driven the growth of the network in the region. The
distinct growth paths under the two investment policies can be seen
more vividly in Figure 5.
Traditionally, a network hierarchy is concerned only with how
nodes are connected to each other, whereas link properties, such as
capacity and the connection cost, are ignored. The ignoring of such
properties may not be a serious problem for some networks on which
nodes are the most important agents in the system [e.g., social net-
works (23) and the World Wide Web (24)]. However, in trans-
portation networks, especially road networks, link properties are of
paramount importance because they largely determine network per-
formance. Therefore, the hierarchy in road networks has at least two
dimensions: the connectivity hierarchy and the capacity hierarchy. A
star network (i.e., a perfect hub-and-spoke system) has the highest
connectivity hierarchy. A network with a link capacity distributed
according to the power law has the highest-capacity hierarchy. The
discussion about the emergence of a road hierarchy in the simulation
experiment presented above considers only the capacity hierarchy
under the two investment policies, because the connectivity hierarchy
is equal by design.
NETWORK FRAGILITY AND VULNERABILITY
The simulated network growth process has many interesting proper-
ties. However, the focus of this research is the relationship between
investment policies, road hierarchy, network fragility, and vulnera-
bility. Does the more hierarchical road arrangement induced by the
bottleneck removal policy have a better failure tolerance than the ﬂat-
ter network from the beneﬁt–cost analysis? A Monte Carlo simula-
tion method was adopted to shed light on this reliability issue. In each
run of the simulation, a certain percentage of links in the equilib-
rium networks under the two investment policies are removed on
the basis of one of three criteria, and the performance characteris-
tics of the degraded networks are assessed. Travel demand is re-
assigned to the remaining links but is not redistributed between
O-D pairs. The assumption here is that capacity loss because of the
various types of road failures described below is not long enough to
cause signiﬁcant demand responses other than rerouting.
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The three network failure scenarios considered are (a) a random
link failure, in which the probability that a link loses its ﬂow-carrying
function is purely random (Scenario 1); (b) a volume-dependent
failure, in which a link carrying more traffic is more likely to break
down than its low-volume peers and the failure rate is proportional
to the traffic volume (Scenario 2); and (c) the most important links,
defined as those with the highest capacity, are destroyed by delib-
erate attacks (Scenario 3). Scenario 1 corresponds well to various
types of non-traffic-related road malfunctioning, including nat-
ural disasters. Scenario 2 tries to capture the impacts of link break-
downs caused by traffic-related incidents, such as accidents and
routine maintenance. The presumed linear relationship between
accident rates and traffic volume is only an approximation and
has been supported by some empirical studies performed with
aggregated traffic data. More recent studies controlling for fac-
tors such as speed, weaving flow, weather, and lighting conditions
(25–28) conclude that the true relationships between accident
rates and traffic flow are more complicated. The level of conges-
tion, often measured by the determination of S, also contributes
to the variation in accident rates in a nonlinear manner (29). Better
models of traffic-related link failure may be adopted in future
research. Scenario 3 tests the serviceability of a road network in the
case of targeted attacks. A Monte Carlo simulation is not required
for Scenario 3, for obvious reasons. A network is considered frag-
ile if it performs poorly with even a small number of random or
volume-dependent link failures. On the other hand, if a network
deteriorates quickly when its most important links are removed, it
is said to be vulnerable.
The flatter road network under the benefit–cost investment rule
displays advantages in all three link failure scenarios (Figure 6).
Each dot in the graph represents the average performance of 30
Monte Carlo simulation runs. It was decided that 30 runs would
be sufficient because the Markovian variation of the average per-
formance is negligible. The smallest performance differences
between the two networks are observed with random failure rates,
and large differences are observed under targeted attacks. In each
one of the three scenarios, the superiority of the flatter network
becomes more obvious as more links are removed. The highly
hierarchical network created by the bottleneck removal policy is
extremely vulnerable. The total travel time increases exponen-
tially as more and more top links are destroyed. In particular, the
total travel time doubles when only 4% of top links (14 of 360)
are removed. This finding is consistent with the identified vulner-
ability of other scale-free or power law networks (24). When the
performance measure is plotted for each network separately, it is
found that the less hierarchical network exhibits slow increases in
travel costs in all types of network degradation (Figure 7). The
relationship between the percentage of removed links and the per-
cent increase in the total travel time is best described by a linear
function. In the network with a higher degree of road hierarchy, non-
linear increases in travel time are evident. In both networks, ran-
dom link failure is the least serious kind of network deterioration
and targeted attacks result in the largest loss of efficiency, a result
that is quite intuitive.
CONCLUSIONS
Models of network growth and policies are able to demonstrate how
the characteristics of investment rules shape the network form, create















FIGURE 4 Distributions of road capacity.the network under normal and degraded conditions. Investment based
on beneﬁt–cost analysis leads to a less hierarchical network structure
than the more myopic bottleneck removal program. In general, a
highly hierarchical network structure displays moderate increases in
travel cost when link failure rates are random or volume dependent,
but the performance of the network deteriorates at an exponential rate
as top links are removed in the case of a targeted attack. In this sense,
a road network with a capacity distributed according to the power law
is slightly fragile but extremely vulnerable. In contrast, a ﬂatter net-
work, such as the one stemming from repetitive beneﬁt–cost analy-
ses, is neither fragile nor vulnerable. It should be pointed out that the
results also do not suggest a zero-hierarchy network. Hierarchy exists
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in road networks for reasons such as economic efficiency, but an
overly hierarchical structure has serious reliability problems (when
both fragility and vulnerability are considered).
These findings have several policy implications. Throughout
the equilibration or evolution process, the network studied under
benefit–cost analysis has better efficiency performance and error
and attack tolerance. Therefore, beneﬁt–cost analysis should be pre-
ferred to the myopic bottleneck removal type of investment rules,
no matter how the planning horizon is speciﬁed. A trade-off between
network efficiency and reliability is not present in the grid network
being analyzed, but such a trade-off may be identiﬁed when other
sets of policies are compared.





        0 ~ 1000 veh/hr 
        1000 ~ 2000 veh/hr 
        2000 ~ 3000 veh/hr 
        3000 ~ 4000 veh/hr 
        > 4000 veh/hr 
FIGURE 5 Network evolution under alternative investment policies.Besides investment rules, revenue mechanisms (e.g., pricing
policies) and ownership structures (e.g., public or private) are also
controllable factors that influence the shape of road networks. The
method described here may also be applied to assessment of the
long-run efficiency and reliability of a road network under any
combination of road financing policies. Application to a realistic
road network would also be interesting and should have immediate
practical signiﬁcance.
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